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Abstract:
Historically and culturally informed, “the corporation” is an
indeterminate concept that shapes and is shaped by prevailing views of
big business in American society.  This is not to say, however, that
scholars and practitioners today agree about how to characterize the
corporate entity.  In his article, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate
Personhood, David Millon shows that corporate personhood — a legal
commonplace today — remains a contested notion that derives its varied
shapes from the philosophical or ideological assumptions of its
proponents; assertions about what corporations are are then supposed to
support normative assumptions about appropriate objectives and content
of corporate law.  Millon traces the development of the corporation-as-
legal-person concept and the debates about what kind of person the
corporation should and could be.  More provocatively, Millon outlines the
current state of the discourse, including the “communitarian” and
“contractarian” theories of the corporation.  These competing
philosophies do not resolve the proper nature of the corporate person but
simply shift the debate to the responsibilities of natural persons toward
each other.  The indeterminacy of the corporate entity remains.  As such,
Millon argues that the more apt question for the future is not the nature of
the corporate person but the proper relations among participants in
corporate activity and between them and the state.  These are questions
about individual responsibility, wealth distribution, and state power.
Professor Millon concludes that inconclusive arguments about corporate
personhood continue to fail to address these important questions
forthrightly.
THE AMBIGUOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
David Millon*
In the eyes of the law, the business corporation is a person. So, for example, the
corporation can own property in its own right; it can sue or be sued, in contract or tort or
any number of other causes of action; it can be prosecuted and punished for criminal
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activity; it enjoys various rights under the United States Constitution; and it is subject to
tax liability.  In these respects (and others), the corporation bears the legal attributes of an
entity existing separately from the various natural persons who participate or have an
interest in the corporation’s activities.
This way of thinking about the corporation has been settled for more than a
hundred years.  Nevertheless, since the corporate form became the preferred vehicle for
business organization during the second half of the nineteenth century, controversy has
surrounded the place of the corporation in American society.  Whether viewed as a
source of monopolistic privilege1 or as a vehicle for dangerous concentration of wealth,2
corporate status has long implied economic and political power without accountability.
Accordingly, historical American fears of unchecked power repeatedly have fueled
debates over the need for legal regulation, even as large-scale production led to
unprecedented efficiency and profits.3
The persistent theme of these debates has been disagreement over the importance
of shareholder wealth maximization as the appropriate objective of corporate activity and
therefore of corporate law. Proponents of a shareholder primacy model argue that
shareholder interests should have priority among all of the various considerations that
corporate management might consider in making policy decisions.4  Critics of this
position have insisted that relentless devotion to shareholder interests imposes costs on
various other constituencies in American society, including employee layoffs, plant
closings, barely acceptable wages and working conditions, environmental pollution, and
financial restructurings that benefit shareholders at the expense of creditors.  Because
shareholder and nonshareholder interests often (though not always) conflict with each
other and no broader political consensus supports a strict shareholder primacy regime,
controversy about corporate law’s appropriate objectives continually resurfaces as current
events seem to attract attention to the social costs of shareholder primacy in different
contexts.
A standard argumentative move in these debates has been the effort to justify a
position for or against legal reform by reference to some kind of characterization of the
corporate person.  A descriptive assertion (“the corporation is x”) is advanced on behalf
of a normative claim (“therefore y should follow”).  In this way, what might otherwise
appear to be abstract, purely academic debates about corporate legal theory in fact
                                                
1For example, a Jacksonian Democrat wrote that “All Bank charters, all laws conferring special
privileges, all acts of incorporation, for purposes of private gain, are monopolies, inasmuch as they are
calculated to enhance the power of wealth, produce inequalities among people, and subvert liberty.”
Quoted in WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 65 (1965).  See generally J.
WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
1780-1970 at 33-36 (1970); LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 194-98 (2d ed. 1985).
2See generally HURST, supra note 1, at 36-47.
3For discussion of the ideal of balanced economic power in American political economy, see
David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1236-63 (1988).
4“Shareholder primacy” expresses the idea that shareholder interests should take priority over
those of nonshareholder constituencies both in corporate law and in managerial decision-making.  For
discussion of some of the complexities of this idea, see Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the
Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1882-86 (1989).
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support controversial political agendas.  We will see, however, that while this form of
argument has been used to substantial rhetorical effect, it has proved to be inconclusive.
“The corporation” turns out to be an indeterminate concept, generating disagreement
about what kind of person the corporate entity is.   Others deny it is an entity at all,
insisting instead that the corporation is merely an aggregation of natural persons.  That
claim, too, resolves nothing, however, because it is possible to characterize the relations
among those persons in different ways.
This essay surveys the principal ways in which partisans of shareholder interests
and their critics have deployed arguments about corporate personhood.  Once the
indeterminacy of this form of argument is appreciated, it will be suggested that political
arguments based on claims about what corporations are obscure the real issues at stake in
these debates.  These are questions about individual responsibility and obligation,
distribution of wealth, and state power.  Inconclusive arguments about corporate
personhood fail to address these questions forthrightly.
I. THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF THE CORPORATION
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY LEGAL THEORY
Although the concept is generally accepted today, 150 years ago it was by no
means clear that the corporation should be thought of as a distinct legal person. 5  In one
influential view, the corporation was nothing more than an aggregation of natural
persons, in this sense no different from a partnership.  According to the author of a
prominent treatise published in 1886, the corporation had no identity apart from its
owners; it “is really an association formed by agreement of its shareholders, and . . . the
existence of the corporation as an entity, independently of its members, is a fiction.”6
Opponents of governmental regulation of the corporation relied on the aggregate
characterization.  This linkage was evident in the United States Supreme Court’s implicit
reliance on an aggregate theory of the corporation in the Santa Clara case, which held
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented the states from
taxing corporate property differently from the property of individuals.7  In the Court’s
view, attempts to tax the corporation directly implicated individual constitutional rights
because no meaningful distinction could be drawn between individual and corporate
property.  Similarly, in the Railroad Tax Cases a lower federal court declared that
                                                
5The best recent treatment of the question of corporate personhood in American law and legal
theory is Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1441 (1987).  For additional historical discussion and consideration of the relationship of corporate
theory to recent political controversies, see David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J.
201, 205-40.
6VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS at iii (2d ed. 1886).
See also HENRY O. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS HAVING CAPITAL
STOCK iv (1884) (“By dismissing this fiction [of the ‘legal person’] a clearer view may be had of the actual
human beings interested, whose rights may then be determined without unnecessary mystification.”).
7Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railway, 118 U.S. 394 (1886).  For clarification of the
assumptions behind this often misunderstood decision, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 at 65-107 (1992); Mark, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
1463-64.
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[t]o deprive the corporation of its property, or to burden it, is, in fact, to
deprive the corporators of their property or to lessen its value. . . . [T]he
courts will look through the ideal entity and name of the corporation to the
persons who compose it, and protect them, though process be in its name.8
The aggregate theory challenged the older notion that the corporation was an
entity or person created by the state. Chief Justice Marshall had this idea in mind in the
Dartmouth College case when he referred to the corporation as “an artificial being,
invisible [and] intangible,” its “individuality” evident in such features as the power to
sue, amenity to suit, and its durational existence defined without regard to the lives of its
shareholders.9  In a similar vein, Angell and Ames’ influential treatise, originally
published in 1831, defined the corporation as a “body, created by law, . . . for certain
purposes, considered as a natural person.”10  Courts routinely construed statutory
references to “persons” to include corporations as well as natural persons.11
The new aggregate theory, with its anti-regulatory trajectory, was important
because the entity idea legitimated state regulation of business activity.  According to this
version of the entity theory, the corporation was a separate person in the eyes of the law,
but personhood had a particular connotation.  The emphasis was on the corporate
person’s artificiality, which was based on the fact that its existence depended on action
by the state.  For most of the nineteenth century, entrepreneurs required a special act of
the legislature granting a charter of incorporation; private initiative alone was
insufficient.  Because the corporate person was a creature of the state, it was assumed to
be subject to whatever limitations or regulatory burdens might emerge from the political
process.  In practice, traditional distrust of corporate economic and political power
resulted in statutory limits on corporate size, wealth, and longevity.  Furthermore,
corporate charters routinely included a narrow definition of corporate purpose, and the
ultra vires doctrine confined corporate activity within these legislatively imposed
boundaries.
By the end of the nineteenth century, economic circumstances increasingly
encouraged expansion of the scale of business activity.  The entity theory, as long as it
justified traditional state-imposed restrictions on accumulation and consolidation, stood
in the way of the emergence of large-scale enterprise.  By appealing to the individual
property rights of the shareholders, the aggregate idea offered a potentially useful
theoretical justification for shielding big business from public supervision.
                                                
8The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 747-48 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), appeal dismissed as moot sub
nom. San Mateo County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885) (holding that Due Process Clause
of Fourteenth Amendment applies to corporations).
9Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636-37 (1819).
10JOSEPH ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE 1 (10th ed. 1875).
11See, e.g., Fisher v. Horicon Iron & Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 351, 355 (1860); People v. Assessors of
Watertown, 1 Hill 616, 620-21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
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However, even as partisans of shareholder property rights successfully used the
aggregate theory against state regulation in cases like Santa Clara, this conception of the
corporation presented difficulties of its own.  Most notably, the analogy of the
corporation to the partnership posed significant obstacles to corporate expansion.  For
one thing, partnership law’s traditional insistence on each partner’s right to participate in
control of the business implied that unanimous shareholder approval was necessary for
corporate mergers and consolidations.  For another, the partnership analogy also
suggested the possibility of shareholder liability in cases of firm insolvency.  Unlimited
liability discouraged passive investment in corporations run by professional managers,
because absentee owners could find their personal assets subject to creditor claims
resulting from irresponsible management decisions over which they had no control.
II. CONSOLIDATION OF THE NATURAL ENTITY THEORY
Perhaps the aggregate theory could have been reinterpreted to respond to these
challenges, but, in the event, a new theory of the corporation emerged in the early
decades of the twentieth century. This theory posited the corporation as a natural entity
rather than an artificial creature of the state.  Inasmuch as the corporation was now
characterized as a natural person, it was that much harder to single out for special
regulatory treatment.  Further, if, as the new theory held, the corporation was a separate
entity in its own right, rather than merely an aggregation of people, a new governance
structure and limited liability for the owners could replace old doctrines of partnership
law that stood in the way of capital formation and professional management.
A. The Naturalness of the Corporation.
The reconceptualization of the corporation as a natural rather than artificial being
was possible because of changes in the law and in economic theory.  During the latter
half of the nineteenth century, states gradually enacted new “general incorporation laws.”
Replacing the old requirement of a special act of the legislature, these statutes (the
ancestors of current corporation laws) made incorporation routinely available to anyone
willing to comply with a few minimal formalities.12  To be sure, the shift to general
incorporation statutes retained a role for the state in the incorporation process and
therefore represented a continuation of the state’s traditional constitutive role.  Still, the
change encouraged a fresh evaluation of the relationship between state and corporation.
Because of the ready availability of corporate status and minimal state involvement, the
state’s role in the creation of the business corporation seemed distinctly secondary to the
creative energy of the entrepreneurs who were responsible for launching the venture.
Meanwhile, economists argued — for the first time — that economic
concentration was inevitable.  Traditional theorists had followed Adam Smith’s
assumption that size eventually yielded inefficiency, at least under ordinary
                                                
12By 1870, general incorporation statutes were replacing special chartering in most states.  See
HURST, supra note 1, at 56.
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circumstances.  As one writer noted, “such are the inherent defects of corporations that
they can never succeed, except when the laws or circumstances give them a monopoly or
advantages partaking of the nature of a monopoly.”13  Without such unfair advantages,
corporations could never “work as cheap as the individual trader.”14  In contrast, a new
generation of economic theorists insisted that economies of scale were far more
pervasively available than previous  economic thinkers assumed.  According to H.C.
Adams, in a range of manufacturing and processing industries, “[c]ost of production
decreases with every additional application of capital in the form of machinery, and with
every extension of the principle of division of labor.”15  The emergence of big business
thus could be the result of natural, impersonal market forces.  In this regard, too, the role
of the state appeared to be minimal.
The tendency to think about the corporation as a natural outgrowth of private
initiative rather than state action seems to have encouraged a broader rethinking of the
state’s traditional regulatory authority, which had been justified by the state’s constitutive
role in corporate formation.16   New ideas about the productive efficiencies of large scale
manufacturing also called into question traditional limitations on consolidation and
capital accumulation.  Though they initially included constraints on corporations’
capacity to grow and amass economic power, general incorporation statutes during the
last years of the nineteenth century eliminated several significant restrictions.  Most
notably, beginning with New Jersey in 1888,17 the states did away with traditional
prohibitions on corporate ownership of stock in other corporations, facilitating the
creation of gigantic holding companies.  In addition, capitalization limits were abolished
and presumptions of eternal life replaced grants of incorporation for limited terms.
B. The Corporation as an Entity.
As legal changes and economic conditions encouraged production on an ever
larger scale, it became increasingly difficult to hold onto older views of the corporation
as mere aggregation and to the partnership law assumptions that were associated with that
view.  Growth in enterprise size required capital accumulation, which, in turn, meant
increasingly wide dispersal of share ownership and relatively small individual holdings.
                                                
13 WILLIAM M. GOUGE, SHORT HISTORY OF PAPER MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES
17 (2d ed. 1835), quoted in Hurst, supra note 1, at 30.  Adam Smith claimed that corporations (joint stock
companies) were less efficient than partnerships or sole proprietorships because managers could never be
expected to work as diligently on behalf of others as they would if working for themselves.  See ADAM
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 699-700 (Modern Library
ed. 1937).  In modern economic parlance, this divergence of interests and effort is the “agency cost”
problem.
14GOUGE, supra, note 13.
15H.C. ADAMS, RELATION OF THE STATE TO INDUSTRIAL ACTION 33 (J. Dorfman ed. 1954).
16 The relation between these developments is complex and not unilinear: while the notion of the
corporation’s naturalness discouraged special regulations, elimination of such restrictions also reinforced
tendencies to think about the corporation in naturalistic terms.
17Act of Apr. 4, 1888, ch. 269, 1888 N.J. Laws 385; Act of Apr. 7, 1888, ch. 295, 1888 N.J. Laws
445.
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This development also called for new managerial expertise and a professional class of
corporate managers emerged to meet that need.18  In this process, shareholders saw their
status transformed from active entrepreneurs to passive investors whose fortunes
depended on the efforts of others.
Traditional legal principles built on the assumption that the shareholder was an
active participant in the business were ill-suited to the shareholder’s new place as mere
investor.  In the area of voting rights, the old rule requiring unanimous shareholder
approval of fundamental transactions (analogous to the rights of partners in a partnership)
gave way to majority rule.19  Once a majority of the shareholders could determine a
corporation’s fate, a corporation’s “will” no longer equated entirely with that of its
shareholders.  Reconceptualization of the shareholder’s role in the corporation – and with
it a new tendency to think of the corporation as an entity existing separately from its
shareholders – was also evident in the emergence of the idea that the powers of the board
of directors were “original and undelegated,”20 rather than a concession flowing from the
shareholders.  At the same time, the shareholders lost the right to participate directly in
management of the corporation, enjoying only the indirect power inherent in their right to
elect the board.  The corporation thus acted through its board, and the board’s power was
coextensive with that of the corporation itself.
The entity idea of the corporation was also connected with subversion of
traditional legal doctrines imposing shareholder liability for corporate obligations.
Through the nineteenth century and even into the early years of the twentieth, corporate
shareholders did not enjoy the limited liability that is a hallmark of share ownership
today.  In virtually every state, shareholders were liable to the creditors of an insolvent
corporation for up to twice the value of their stock.21  In addition, the “trust fund
doctrine” exposed shareholders to personal liability in cases of corporate insolvency to
the extent they had not paid the par value of their stock.22  The emergence of an active
secondary market for corporate stock undermined this doctrine when it replaced the older
practice of private stock subscriptions, and the “trust fund doctrine” was rejected entirely
in a series of judicial opinions that began to appear at the end of the nineteenth century.23
As shareholders became passive investors rather than active owners responsible for
corporate decision-making it made less and less sense to look to them to satisfy corporate
obligations.  Creditor claims should instead be limited to assets held in the name of the
corporation.
                                                
18See generally  ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 381-483 (1977).
19For example, by 1927 at least 20 states adopted statutes conditioning approval of mergers on
majority shareholder approval; in exchange for the loss of veto power, dissenting shareholders obtained a
new right to a judicial appraisal of the value of their stock.  See Joseph L. Weiner, Payment of Dissenting
Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 548 n. 7 (1927).
20See Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 322, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (1918).
21See 1 WILLIAM W. COOK, TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 270-75 (3rd ed. 1894).
22The leading case was Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824).
23See, e.g., Christensen v. Eno, 106 N.Y. 97, 12 N.E. 648 (1887); Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg.
Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. 1117 (1892).
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C. The Natural Entity as a Person
Once the corporation could be thought of as a distinct person born of private
initiative rather than state action, the lure of metaphor might have encouraged legal
theorists to take the further step of assimilating this person to a natural human being.
After all, corporate persons were born and could die, and they were capable of doing
many of the things that humans did, like own property, commit crimes, file lawsuits, and
pay taxes.  Legal theorists also showed how it was possible to talk of a corporation’s
“will” as being distinct from that of its shareholders.24  Nevertheless, American theorists
for the most part resisted extreme efforts to equate corporate persons with natural ones.25
As a result, there was room for substantial disagreement over just what kind of person the
corporation was, and, therefore, what the law’s stance toward that person ought to be.
D. The Politics of the Natural Entity Theory
Regardless of this lingering uncertainty, the natural entity theory had two
important political implications as it took hold in the early twentieth century.  The
minimization of the state’s role in the incorporation process — in favor of the view that
the corporation was the product of private initiative and inevitable market forces —
discouraged legal regulations that applied specially to corporations.  Older concerns
about the social and political costs of economic concentration, therefore, ceased to find
expression in corporate law.
As corporate law disclaimed any public regulatory function, it took on a new
focus.  Now operating on an unprecedented scale, the publicly owned corporation had
become a complex, far-flung organization under the supervision of a cadre of
professional managers.  It no longer resembled the small, locally owned partnership.
With the advent of this separation between ownership and control, rendering managers
accountable to the shareholders became corporate law’s primary objective.
There surely was nothing inevitable about corporate law turning inward in this
manner.  Traditional concerns about the dangers of economic concentration could have
been exacerbated by the emergence of big business.  Corporate law could have addressed
these fears by using existing regulatory techniques – such as limits on capitalization and
restriction on combinations – but it did not.  Instead, the anti-regulatory impulse implied
by the vision of the corporation as natural and private yielded an internal focus in place of
older attention to the external relations between the corporation and the larger society.  In
this regard, corporate law’s acceptance of economic concentration only mirrored the
larger success of a legitimating strategy wholly at odds with an older commitment to
dispersed, balanced economic power.
                                                
24See ERNEST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS 52–55 (1897) (corporate will as
decision of a majority of the corporation’s managers).
25See Mark, supra note 5, at 1473–74.
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III. CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP
In retrospect, the acceptance of the idea that the giant business corporation is an
entity separate from its shareholders seems plausible. The group of shareholders had
become a large, anonymous mass of investors, shifting in composition and barely
involved in the business itself.  Others did the actual work of production, under the
supervision of professional managers.  The old identity between a business and its owners
no longer made sense.
More surprising was the notion that the law should accord this legal construct
status essentially similar to a natural person.  Without this additional move, the
corporation, as a special kind of entity, could still have been subject to special legal
regulations.  If, however, this entity was to be viewed in the same light as natural persons,
there was a basis for arguing that the corporation should be exempt from special efforts to
regulate its conduct that did not apply to natural persons.
It soon became apparent, however, that the corporation-as-person idea itself
possessed  implications capable of subverting its anti-regulatory, internal vision for
corporate law.  In the wake of the Great Depression, critics turned their attention to
perceived abuses of large corporations’ economic power.  In an article published in 1932,
Harvard Law School professor E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. showed how the entity conception of
the corporation could provide an effective basis for a theory of corporate social
responsibility.26  Dodd noted that a corporation’s constituencies included more than just
the shareholders.  Employees, consumers, creditors, and the communities in which plants
were located all had a stake in management’s decisions about how to run the business.
Furthermore, these interests could conflict with those of the shareholders.  Policies
designed to benefit lower-level workers, for example, could result in lower corporate
profits and therefore a lower rate of return for shareholders.
If corporate managers were thought of simply as trustees or agents for the
shareholders,27 policies that deviated from shareholder wealth maximization were an
illegitimate abuse of power.  However, if in fact the corporation was an entity existing
separately from its shareholders, management acted on behalf of the corporation and its
business decisions involved the corporation’s property.  In other words, an entity theory
of the corporation rejected the notion that management worked directly for the
shareholders and was charged to manage their property.  Shareholders had interests in the
corporation that were entitled to due regard, but so, too, did the various other
nonshareholder constituencies of the corporation.  Presumably their well-being ought to
be taken into account as well.
Once the idea of management’s sole duty to shareholders had been challenged and
a potentially broader conception offered in its place, it was possible both to expand the
idea of what counted as the corporation’s internal affairs and also to downplay the
significance of the internal/external distinction itself.  Not only were workers and other
providers of inputs affected by management’s control of the corporate entity with which
                                                
26 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145
(1932).
27Dodd’s article was a response to this argument, presented in Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).
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they dealt; the corporation’s activities also had potential effects on society at large.  If a
focus solely on shareholder financial interests ignored questions about the corporation’s
potentially broad and costly social effects, how should corporate law think about the
corporation?
Dodd’s answer drew on what he saw as an emerging trend among business
leaders to think of the corporate entity as a citizen rather than just an engine for
shareholder wealth accumulation:
If we think of it as an institution which differs in the
nature of things from the individuals who compose it, we
may then readily conceive of it as a person, which, like
other persons engaged in business, is affected not only by
the laws which regulate business but also by the attitude
of public and business opinion as to the social obligations
of business.28
Dodd quoted Owen D. Young, an officer of General Electric Co., who argued that the
corporation should recognize “its public obligations and perform its public duties — in a
word, vast as it is, that it should be a good citizen.”29  Applied to natural persons, the idea
of good citizenship implies right conduct in the context of a community of others.  It
emphasizes the aspect of personhood that encompasses affirmative obligations toward
one’s neighbors and de-emphasizes that other aspect, the individual’s right to be free
from coercion by the group.  Regard for others and a willingness to sacrifice personal
interests for others’ sake characterize responsible citizenship.
Applied to the corporation, citizenship likewise suggests other-regarding
obligation.  The corporate person needs to be sensitive to the impact of its activities on
those whose lives it affects, including not just its investors, but also employees, creditors,
consumers, and the larger society in which it operates.  Certainly a narrow-minded focus
on profit maximization without regard to social costs would be inappropriate for the
corporate citizen, just as it would be for the natural person.
Relying on the citizenship idea, theorists like Dodd30 turned the privatized, anti-
regulatory, shareholder primacy premises of the entity theory of the corporation on their
heads.  In their place, citizenship theorists substituted a public notion of corporate law,
                                                
28Dodd, supra note 26, at 1161.
29Id. at 1154.  Regarding the categories of people who have an interest in the corporation, Young
referred to workers, customers, and the general public, in addition to its shareholders.
30For a more recent statement, see James Boyd White, How Should We Talk About Corporations?
The Languages of Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416 (1985).  Boyd writes:
The corporation is and always has been a collective citizen.  It serves not only its shareholders, but
its bondholders and creditors of other kinds, as well as its employees and future employees, its suppliers
and customers.  It has the proper aim not only of making money but of maintaining the conditions that
make meaningful economic and social activity possible, for itself and for others.  It is a citizen, and I
believe it should be spoken of as having both the responsibilities and benefits of that status.
Id. at 1418.
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based on the public effects of corporate activity, which implied a much richer notion of
obligation than a unitary duty to shareholders.
The emergence of ambiguity in the normative implications of the entity theory
should not be surprising.  Once the entity was thought of as a person, uncertainty
followed because the concept of personhood is itself rich and ambiguous.  In our
tradition, one aspect of personhood is, of course, a claim to be free from discriminatory
legal restrictions.  This idea inspired earlier efforts to analogize the corporation to a
natural person.  But personality implies much more than just a negative right to freedom
from coercion.  There are also notions of obligation that have occupied moral
philosophers for centuries.  Dodd and his fellow corporate social responsibility advocates
simply drew on this basic premise when they suggested that the corporate person should
bear the responsibilities of a citizen.
Dodd’s subversive spin on the entity idea was not just the product of abstract
theorizing.  As his quotation of the business leader revealed, critique of a simple anti-
regulatory, profit maximization agenda already abounded in American political
discourse.  The success of the natural entity metaphor had itself depended on changes in
political thought (even as it was used to influence politics), and as uncertainties in that
realm emerged, so too were they bound to emerge in the area of corporate theory.  As
always, debates about corporate personality reflected larger political controversies, just as
the theories themselves were used to intervene in those debates.
IV. THE PERSON AS PROPERTY
Dodd’s argument for corporate social responsibility based on a citizenship model
met with a forceful response from advocates of shareholder financial interests, most
notably Adolf Berle and Garner Means.  In their famous book, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property, published in 1932,31 Berle and Means did not challenge the
corporation-as-entity notion; to the contrary, their emphasis on the separation between
ownership and control seemed to confirm the notion that the corporation existed apart
from its shareholders.  They raised a new question that relied on an old idea: ownership
and the shareholders’ claim, based on property rights, of privileged status among the
corporation’s various constituencies.  The property rights argument did not claim that the
shareholders themselves owned the assets of the business enterprise; it was undeniable
that legal title was vested in the corporate entity.  However, if the shareholders owned the
corporate entity, management arguably owed a duty to them to manage the shareholders’
property solely in their best interests:  “The corporation was theirs, to be operated for
their benefit.”32  Accordingly, corporate management exercised control over the
corporation like trustees administering a trust; the corporation was the trust property and
their powers were therefore “powers in trust.”  As such, these powers were “necessarily
                                                
31ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
32Id. at 334.  See also id. at 354 (“a corporation ‘belongs’ to its shareholders . . . and theirs is the
only interest to be recognized as the object of corporate activity”).
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and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their
interest appears.”33
The problem, in Berle and Means’ view, was the danger that management might
fail to discharge its trust obligation.  A new separation between ownership and control
was the result of widely dispersed share ownership, which in turn made a practical
necessity of governance by a small group of professional managers whose personal
ownership interests in the corporation typically were negligible.   Because the people who
owned the corporation did not control it, there was a distinct possibility that those who
did would exercise their power in ways that were not in the shareholders’ best interests.
Separation thus meant discretion, and that raised important questions of accountability
and legitimacy.
Berle and Means thus drew attention to what they perceived as the dark side of
the managerial discretion on which Dodd had based his argument for corporate
citizenship.  If those in control of the corporation possessed the power to deploy
corporate resources and make strategic decisions according to considerations of public
welfare, clearly they might act in ways that failed to maximize shareholder wealth.  From
the shareholders’ point of view, management’s use of its powers of control to benefit
nonshareholder constituencies at the shareholders’ expense was just as illegitimate as
outright theft.  Either way, management was breaching its obligation to hold the
shareholders’ property in trust for their benefit.  The property rights argument, which had
its roots in old ideas about the ownership of business organizations, therefore supported
the view that shareholders, among all the constituencies interested in a corporation’s
behavior, should hold a place of primacy.
The property rights argument against corporate social responsibility did not
directly address Dodd’s corporation-as-citizen spin on the corporate personhood idea.
Berle and Means acknowledged that the corporation is a separate entity34 and that
incorporation creates a “legal person independent of any of the associates.”35  However,
even though they could not avoid the organic metaphor,36 their argument for shareholder
rights based on ownership in effect “de-humanized” the corporate  person.  Had they
retained Dodd’s identification of the corporation with a natural person, Berle and Means’
ownership argument would have required denial of that person’s free agency.  Dodd’s
citizen would have been transformed into a slave.  Instead, they simply asserted that the
corporation was a piece of property.  The denial of Dodd’s analogy to the natural person
was implicit and allowed Berle and Means (and subsequent theorists) to sidestep a direct
confrontation over the accuracy of the corporation-as-citizen metaphor.
                                                
33Id. at 248.
34See id. at 221-22 (“the corporation is a distinct legal entity, separate and apart from
stockholders”).
35Id. at 128.
36See id. at 134 (corporation as a “business organism”), 357 (“economic organism”).
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V. REVIVAL OF THE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DEBATE
The corporate social responsibility idea advanced by Dodd resurfaced in the
1950s and 1960s.  One strand of argument seemed implicitly to rely on a conception of
corporate personhood, but it was very different from the one that Dodd had in mind.  The
thrust of Dodd’s legal argument had been to show that current corporate law allowed
management freedom to act as good citizens, and he claimed to identify an actual trend in
that direction.  However, lurking in the background of the idea of the corporation as a
citizen was another implication.  If social and economic power gave rise to a
responsibility to act with due regard toward those affected, it would not be a large step to
suggest that the obligations of citizenship might need to be embodied in rules of law if
corporate citizens chose to act irresponsibly.  Corporate persons, like natural persons who
fail to live up to society’s expectations, might be coerced into doing the right thing.37
By the 1970s, Dodd’s optimistic assessment seemed unrealistic in many circles.
Ralph Nader and his colleagues pointed to the tremendous economic power of America’s
largest corporations – power that could not have been imagined in 1932 – and laid a
catalog of social problems at their doorstep.  These included industrial environmental
pollution, workplace toxicity, employment discrimination based on race and sex,
workplace alienation, illegitimate political influence, unsafe products, and monopoly
power.38  Freedom from meaningful regulation, while it might allow corporations to act
as good citizens, was not enough because it did nothing to promote socially responsible
behavior if corporations chose not to pursue the best moral options.  The states were
unlikely to respond to this problem, because competition for corporate charters
encouraged leniency rather than regulation.  Nader therefore proposed that responsibility
for incorporation be transferred from the states to the federal government, which would
impose a wide range of regulations on corporate activity through the chartering process.
Nader did not rely explicitly on the citizenship metaphor.  In his view, it was
sufficient to point to the vast size and power of America’s largest corporations and assign
responsibility for a long list of social ills.  However, by conceiving of the corporation as
an actor capable of committing a range of wrongs and therefore an appropriate object of
regulation, he implicitly conjured up images of gigantic entities of great power.39  Rather
than good citizens, Nader claimed to see a race of Goliaths striding irresponsibly across
the landscape in search of profits, leaving paths of destruction in their wake.
VI. DE-REIFYING THE CORPORATE PERSON
In different ways, Dodd, Berle and Means, and Nader all relied on an entity
                                                
37Dodd himself had suggested as much when he expressed the hope that the law might “keep those
who failed to catch the new spirit of [public service] up to the standards which their more enlightened
competitors would desire to adopt voluntarily.”  Dodd, supra note 26, at 1153.
38RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN, & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 17-32
(1976).
39See id. at 16 (likening giant corporations to high-powered “[h]erbivorous dinosaurs”).
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conception of corporate personhood.  Each of them characterized the corporate person in
a different way, because the descriptive assertion supported a conclusion about how the
law ought to treat corporate activity.  In fact, any particular characterization was
inevitably controversial because several different descriptions could plausibly be
advanced, depending on the traits one wished to emphasize.  The exercise, while
purportedly a matter of disinterested observation, was not like counting the number of
pigeons on a clothesline or describing a ball as red instead of blue.  The entity itself was
actually an intellectual construct and its content was vague enough to support different
descriptions.  These differences were themselves reflections of competing normative
agendas. The priority of the positive claim over the normative one was actually only a
matter of rhetoric.
Rather than proposing yet another vision of the corporate person, the most
prominent response to the social responsibility revival dispensed with an entity
conception of corporate personhood altogether.  Like Berle and Means, Milton Friedman,
in a well known New York Times article, focused attention on the rights of shareholders.40
However, rather than speaking of corporate managers as trustees managing the corporate
entity for their benefit, Friedman referred to them as employees.  The shareholders, who
had put up the capital, hired management “to conduct the business in accordance with
[the shareholders’] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as
possible.”41  Management’s dealings with workers, creditors, and suppliers of goods and
services were all undertaken on behalf of the shareholders and for their benefit.
Friedman’s agency idea had the same thrust as did Berle and Means’ trust model.
In either event, management acted improperly if it did anything other than maximize
profits.  However, while Berle and Means saw the corporation as an item of property
managed by trustees, Friedman grounded corporate managers’ exclusive obligation to the
shareholders solely on their contractual status as agents.  There was no need to worry
about the implications of corporate personhood or questions of ownership, because the
entity was nothing but a legal fiction.  This is what Friedman had in mind when he
derided the idea that corporations as such could have social responsibilities:  “What does
it mean to say that ‘business’ has responsibilities?  Only people can have
responsibilities.”42  A corporation, Friedman wrote, was merely “an artificial person” and
failure to appreciate this fact prevented people from understanding what was really at
stake when corporate managers compromised the quest for profits in favor of other
agendas.
Friedman’s exclusive emphasis on the interests of shareholders did not indicate a
failure to appreciate that efforts to maximize profits for shareholders generated social
costs.  Like Nader, he understood that profit-seeking can generate externalities, and that
various members of the public may be affected adversely.  The question for Friedman
was how such problems ought to be addressed, and he took for granted that a government
accountable to the public, rather than private initiatives undertaken in the boardroom,
                                                
40Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
41Id. at 33.
42Id.
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should make the necessary cost-benefit decisions.  Corporate policies that aimed to
benefit nonshareholder constituencies at the shareholders’ expense (such as corporate
philanthropy or wages that were higher than market rates) amounted to a tax levied on the
shareholders’ wealth.  Unelected private parties thereby used other peoples’ money to
pursue their own notions of public welfare.
Friedman claimed to take a realistic look at the corporation as it actually
functions.  In his view, the shareholders’ status as the contributors of the corporation’s
capital led readily to the conclusion that corporate management, as their agent, should
devote its energies to maximizing return on their investment.  The argument dispensed
entirely with the idea that the corporation was an entity existing separately from its
constituent participants and focused attention instead on those relationships.  The
corporate person was reduced to the shareholders and their agents.  The result was an
aggregate conception of corporate personhood.
VII. CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
Subsequent economists, sharing Friedman’s Chicago School anti-regulatory bent,
have pursued a similar argumentative strategy.  However, rather than emphasizing a
shareholder-management employment relationship, these theorists describe the
corporation as a “nexus of contracts” among all the participants in a corporation’s
activity.43  According to this view, “the corporation is seen as a market writ small, a web
of ongoing contracts (explicit or implicit) between various real persons.  The notion that
corporations are ‘persons’ is seen as a weak and unimportant fiction.”44  The terms of
these contracts are supplied either by actual bargaining or by the rules of corporate law
itself.  Efforts by government to impose obligations on the parties to these arrangements
offend the freedom of contract, anti-redistributive ideology that lies at the heart of the
nexus-of-contracts agenda.  Thus, contractarians claim contract as the source of
shareholders’ entitlement to profit maximization, dispensing with property rights.
Nevertheless, the corporation is de-reified; the point of the exercise again is to justify
shareholder primacy.
Friedman’s property rights argument and fellow economists’ nexus-of-contracts
model appeared to escape from the indeterminacy of the corporation-as-person idea,
which could support both social responsibility and shareholder primacy agendas. Once
one thought of the corporation as nothing more than a set of relationships among the
natural persons involved in production, notions of corporate citizenship made no sense.
In the words of a prominent theorist, “Since it is a legal fiction, a corporation is incapable
of having social or moral obligations, much in the same way that inanimate objects are
                                                
43The most important and thorough application of this idea is FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).  For a concise overview, see Henry N.
Butler, The Contractual Nature of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 100 (1989).
44William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1395, 1400 (1993).
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incapable of having these obligations.  Only people can have moral obligations or social
responsibility.”45
It turns out, however, that the corporate law contractarians’ de-reification strategy
cannot end the debate.  Controversy merely shifts from the nature of the corporate person
to the responsibilities of natural persons toward each other.  Thus “communitarian”
critics of the contractarian position similarly disregard the question of corporate
personhood and focus instead on the relationships among the actual participants in
corporate activity.46  In place of a vision of the corporation as a market in which self-
seeking individuals come together in order to seek private advantage, critics see the
corporation as a community in which such values as trust and respect for others
determine the success of the venture.  Because these values are a necessary part of intra-
corporate relations, communitarians reject the contractarians’ simplistic commitment to
shareholder primacy and profit maximization.
One communitarian approach argues for broader participation in corporate
governance.  Toward this end, Abram Chayes criticized corporate law’s conventional
focus on shareholders:  “A concept of the corporation which draws the boundary of
‘membership’ this narrowly is seriously inadequate. . . . A more spacious conception of
‘membership,’ and one closer to the facts of corporate life, would include all those having
a relation of sufficient intimacy with the corporation or subject to its power in a
sufficiently specialized way.”47  All these people, in Chayes’s view, ought to have the
benefit of “an institutional arrangement appropriately designed to represent the interests
of a constituency of members having a significant common relation to the corporation
and its power.”48
Chayes’ strategy of bringing affected nonshareholder constituencies into
corporate governance was one way to use an aggregate theory to counter shareholder
primacy.  Other critics have argued that nonshareholder constituencies develop
enforceable legal rights through their commitment to long-term relationships of mutual
                                                
45Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (1982).
46Whether there is more to “communitarianism” in corporate law scholarship than a shared critical
stance toward shareholder primacy is not entirely clear.  Important contributions have come from such
scholars as Bill Bratton, Lyman Johnson, Larry Mitchell, and Marleen O’Connor.  For a general discussion
and an effort to identify a common agenda, see David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law:
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed.,
1995).  For a now incomplete bibliography of scholarship in a more or less communitarian mode, see David
Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1373, 1391-93 (1993).
47 Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION AND
MODERN SOCIETY 25, 41 (E. Mason ed. 1959).  Strictly speaking, it is a misnomer to refer to Chayes as a
communitarian because at the time he wrote this article, that label had not yet appeared in corporate law
scholarship.  Nevertheless, the approach he took resonates with current scholarship that has been termed
communitarian.  That term was first applied by critics of scholars who were advocating reform of the
shareholder primacy idea.  See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and
Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 395 (1993)
(labeling critics of shareholder primacy “communitarians” because they favor a “public law” conception of
corporate law).
48Chayes, supra note 47, at 41.
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interdependence and vulnerability.49  Natural persons are moral agents – even if the
fictitious corporate entity is not – and their dealings with others can give rise to
obligations that supplement or even supercede contract.  Having induced nonshareholders
to rely on legitimate expectations of fair dealing, shareholders therefore may forfeit the
right to insist on contract terms guaranteeing profits at the expense of others.
Yet another communitarian strategy rejects the sufficiency of contract as the
vehicle for the definition of the rights of nonshareholder constituencies.  For example, if
workers must bargain for job security and pay for it in the form of lower wages, their
well-being depends on whatever bargaining leverage they are able to exert.  One response
is to redefine management’s fiduciary duty to encompass regard for nonshareholders as
well as shareholders.50  It may also be possible that reversal of existing default rules (for
example, from employment-at-will to job security) could improve bargaining outcomes
for workers and perhaps other nonshareholders, too.51
Today’s version of the debate over the desirability of shareholder primacy is
conducted without regard to entity-based arguments over corporate personhood.52
Perhaps this omission marks a reaction to the indeterminacy of assertions about what
kind of “person” the corporation is.  More likely, the move to an aggregate conception
reflects impatience with arguments based on metaphor in favor of a more hardheaded
emphasis on what corporations “really” are.  Here too, however, we encounter
indeterminacy.  Partisans of both sides of this debate look at the same set of human
relationships but characterize the ties that bind these people together in different ways.
At the core of the communitarian critique of shareholder primacy is rejection of
the contractarian premise that people are entitled only to what they can bargain and pay
for.  This difference, in turn, can be traced to distinct characterizations of the people who
actually constitute the corporation.  Contractarians see a web of atomistic, self-seeking
individuals devoted to wealth maximization.  From that observation they derive the
normative conclusion that corporate law’s job is to facilitate their pursuits.  Rules that
impose obligations to which they have not consented interfere with that objective and
therefore are illegitimate.  In contrast, critics of shareholder primacy observe a
community of participants who may or may not be capable of obtaining an acceptable
standard of living through their own devices.  They find themselves bound together in a
common venture and therefore depend on each other’s efforts for its success.  This
                                                
49Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
50Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991).
51David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment at
Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975 (1998).
52An important exception is the recent work of Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout.  In contrast to the
corporation-as-community idea, these critics of shareholder primacy have described the corporation as a
team.  Interestingly, they rely on an entity conception of the corporation to ground an argument for an
independent board of directors responsible for balancing the interests of all of the corporation’s
constituencies.  See Margret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247 (1999).  For criticism of the Blair and Stout argument on the ground (among others) that it does
not improve the bargaining situation of nonshareholders in relation to shareholders, see David Millon, New
Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1001 (2000).
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commonality of interest can give rise to obligations or burdens that reduce some peoples’
shares of the joint product in order to confer on others more than could be obtained
through the exercise of bargaining leverage alone.  However selfishly motivated
individual participants might be, they in effect agree to temper their own claims once
they enter into a community founded on cooperation.
So, just as proponents and critics of shareholder primacy were able to look at the
corporate person and see different beings supporting competing normative agendas, the
turn to a de-personalized corporation yields similar results because the aggregation of
natural persons is also subject to competing characterizations.  Resolution of this debate
is not a matter of observation and description.  The people involved in corporate life are
real and their activities can be observed and described, but the ties of obligation that bind
people together are themselves invisible.  Claims about the extent and nature of
interpersonal obligation therefore are really claims about how relationships ought to be
understood.  As was the case with entity-based arguments, the differences between
contractarians and communitarians are really normative arguments masquerading as
positive assertions.
VIII. DOES PERSONIFICATION MATTER?
Communitarians’ use of an aggregate theory of the corporation looks closely at
existing relationships and attempts to alter or adjust those relationships in ways that
improve the status of nonshareholders in relation to shareholders.  In this respect, the
argumentative strategy differs from the entity-based arguments for corporate social
responsibility of Dodd and Nader, both of whom conceive of the corporation as a person
whose actions affect broad segments of the American public.  Conceding this difference,
is it one that matters?
Both the communitarians and the contractarians share a similar focus on the
relationships among the corporation’s participants.  Chayes, for example, speaks of “the
line between those who are ‘inside’ and those who are ‘outside’ the corporation.”53  This
line is important because, in his view, those who are on the inside are entitled to
participate in corporate governance, and the thrust of his argument was that more than
just the shareholders should be considered within the boundary.  Contractarians similarly
focus on those who have entered into contractual relations with each other, and
communitarians refer to those participants in corporate activity who are part of a single
community constituted by their relationships with each other.  For both contractarians
and communitarians, the spotlight is on the insiders, and corporate law therefore looks
inward, at the relations among the corporation’s various participants.
If instead of speaking of the corporation as a collection of natural persons one
thinks of it as an entity, it may be necessary to think about corporate law in a different
way.  The question now is the relation between the corporate person and those natural
persons with whom it comes in contact.  These people include its shareholders, its
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employees and other “insiders.”  The law must concern itself with their relationships to
the corporation.  In addition, however, corporate activity can also affect other people
whom it is difficult to think of as being part of or inside the corporation.
Consider, for example, a corporation that pollutes the environment here in the
United States or discharges toxic chemicals in some far away country, affecting the lives
of individuals who may have no other connection with the corporation.  An entity theory
of the corporation readily accommodates the possibility of legal regulation or civil
damages liability for the benefit of such outsiders.  The corporate person is treated as an
actor and legal consequences can be assigned to its behavior.  In contrast, thinking of the
corporation in aggregate terms complicates the issue.  If rights and obligations are a
function of membership in a single community, the claims of pollution victims depend on
defining the corporation in a way that embraces thousands of people who otherwise are
unconnected with the corporation’s activities.  The inward-looking focus of the
corporation-as-community model does not lend itself well to thinking about such
problems because doing so threatens to expand the boundaries of the corporation so
broadly that it ends up dissolving into the larger society.  Public regulation of corporate
activity therefore seems more problematic under an aggregate theory of the corporation.
This way of thinking about the matter thus differentiates older entity-based arguments for
corporate social responsibility from more recent communitarian law reform proposals,
which depend on aggregate assumptions.
Even so, there is something to be said in defense of aggregate-based approaches
to questions of obligation arising out of corporate activity.  While an entity theory can
facilitate assignment of responsibility for harmful effects as an analytical matter, it will
not necessarily put the burdens where they belong.  Criminal fines or civil damages
liability, for example, will deplete the corporate treasury and thereby reduce the value of
the shareholders’ interest in the corporation.  Yet the shareholders themselves, ordinarily
uninvolved in the decisions for which liability has been imposed, would seem less
deserving of punishment than would the managers who actually made the decisions at
issue.  An aggregate analysis, which discards the notion of the corporate entity as actor,
could more readily facilitate assigning responsibility to the real culprits.
This last point does not necessarily lend support to a communitarian
understanding of obligation because there is still the problem, already discussed, of
bringing the victims of corporate wrong-doing into the corporate community.  Perhaps,
then, the real challenge is to discard both entity- and aggregate-based arguments for
responsibility and turn attention instead to the individual actors and the question of their
responsibility, without regard to anyone’s status in relation to a corporation.  If one does
this, the boundary between the corporation – entity or aggregate – and the rest of society
dissolves completely and we are left with the stark question of the obligations of
individuals to each other.  Ironically, the contractarians’ denial of a distinction between
intra- and extra-corporate interactions in favor of a model that sees all interpersonal
relations as occurring in a single, all-encompassing market may point in the right
direction.  But theirs is only a first step.  It is also necessary to accept the possibility that
personal obligation can arise independently of consent.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The long-standing controversy over the rights of corporate shareholders in
relation to nonshareholders involved in or affected by corporate activity is no closer to
resolution today than it ever has been.  At times, the argument has assumed that the
corporation is an entity separate from its constituents, and disagreement has centered on
the question of what kind of person the corporation is.  More recently, the debate has
been conducted in terms of aggregate theories of corporate personhood, forsaking entity
notions in the name of realism.  The point of these arguments over characterization has
been to support various normative claims, but the normative issues remain unresolved
because the questions of characterization necessarily remain controversial.  So, just as it
is possible to argue over whether the corporation is really an entity or, instead, is just an
aggregation, acceptance of one position or the other settles nothing because there is no
agreement over what kind of person the entity is, any more than there is consensus over
how to think of the relationships among the natural persons who have associated with
each in the name of a corporation.
It would be interesting to know whether this form of argument, according to
which normative conclusions are supposed to follow from an ostensibly disinterested
characterization of a group or activity as one thing or another, can be found in other areas
of the law and how prevalent it may be.  If it is to be found outside of corporate law, it
seems unlikely that it would be any more determinate in those contexts, because
characterization of human activity is not a matter of objectively true assertions about real
phenomena.  Human beings are too complex in their motivations, and the nature of their
relations to each other is too mysterious to lend itself to simple, reductive assertions
about things as they are.
At least in the area of corporate law, efforts to derive “ought” from “is” have not
succeeded.  Indeed, such intellectual exercises may have stood in the way of careful
examination of the truly urgent questions raised by corporate activity.  Analysis of
difficult questions of social policy have probably been hindered by assumptions about the
distinctiveness of activity in the corporate form, whether the corporation is thought to be
an entity or instead is an aggregation of people distinct from the rest of society.  Perhaps
we would be better off if we concentrated instead on the problem of personal obligation.
That problem, of course, is no easy matter, and closure is no more likely to be reached.
Nevertheless, at least we will have jettisoned our obsession with the endlessly fascinating
but inevitably indeterminate question of corporate personhood.  Then we can proceed
with an appropriately focused debate.
